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INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 2008, the United States Federal Reserve Bank, under
the chairmanship of Ben Bernanke, took emergency measures in an
attempt to forestall a national, if not international, economic meltdown.
The actual effectiveness of these unprecedented measures has been hotly
debated. Unfortunately, regardless of their efficacy, the Federal Reserve
stepped outside the scope of its legal authority in taking several of these
actions.
This Essay will analyze how the Federal Reserve (the Fed) violated the
law and, in doing so, will examine how these illegal actions have
compromised the authority that Congress has granted to the Fed. In order
to place this malfeasance into context, this Essay will examine the origins
of the Federal Reserve and how this unique entity has dramatically, and
often controversially, expanded the scope of its power.
It will then analyze how the Fed's willful violation of the law has
critically undermined the United States' economy in both the short- and
long-term. Finally, it will conclude by proposing legislative reform that
would begin to resolve this problem by placing the secretive maneuvers of
the Fed into the full light of public scrutiny.
Ultimately, when viewed objectively and within its historical context,
it is clear that the Fed acted beyond the scope of its legislative authority
and, by doing so, harmed the financial interests of the United States, both
at home and abroad. This warrants, at the very least, a full and
independent audit of the Federal Reserve System to determine its
compliance with existing law.
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THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

A. CongressionalEfforts that Led to the FederalReserve
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 established the Fed as the central
bank for the United States.' Prior to that, several attempts to centralize
banking efforts had come and gone. For instance, in 1791, Congress
chartered the First Bank of the United States.2 The Second Bank of the
United States was chartered after the first had expired.3 After the Second
National Bank charter expired in 1836, the country operated without a
central bank.4
In 1907, several bank panics renewed the debate regarding the wisdom
of establishing a central bank.5 Existing law at the time mandated that6
banks maintain only a small fraction of their overall deposits in reserve.
The remaining reserves could be used to offer loans. 7 Unfortunately, these
low deposit reserve requirements often led to over-lending. 8 Banks made
loans that, in the short run, could only be converted into cash at a fraction
of their value. 910 This resulted in a "race to the bank" when liquidity
problems arose.
Ultimately, several influential leaders of the nation's financial
community concluded that federal action was needed to remedy a lack of
* Chad Denver Emerson is an Associate Professor of Law at Faulkner
University's
Thomas Goode Jones School of Law. He would like to thank his research assistant Robyn
Cannon for her excellent and thorough assistance in this matter. He would also like to
thank Karl Denninger for his research and attention into this important matter.
1. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913); see also The
Federal Reserve Board, The Structure of the Federal Reserve System, http://www.federal
reserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frseri.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
2. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191 (1791).
3. Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266 (1816).
4. See ROGER T. JOHNSON, HISTORICAL BEGINNINGS: THE FEDERAL RESERVE 10

(Mary Jane Coyle ed., 1999).
5. See id at 16-19; see also Michael A. Whitehouse, Paul Warburg's Crusade to
Establish a Central Bank in the United States, THE REGION, May 1989,
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publicationspapers/pubdisplay.cfm?id=3815.
6. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, § 41, 12 Stat. 665, 677 (1863); see also JOHNSON,
supra note 4, at 10, 15.
7. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, § 41, 12 Stat. at 677.

8. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY

OF THE UNITED STATES 1867-1960 (1963); Whitehouse, supra note 5.
9. See generally FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 8.
10. See generally id.; Whitehouse, supra note 5.
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liquidity in the country's economy." The Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908
created the National Monetary Commission and tasked it with the
responsibility of proposing a permanent solution to the problems of
illiquidity and bank panics. The work of this Commission ultimately led
to the creation of today's Federal Reserve System.
B. The Adoption of the 1913 FederalReserve Act
Following the adoption of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act in 1908, the
National Monetary Commission, headed by Senator Nelson Aldrich,
researched different banking and currency schemes' 3 and focused on the
European banking system. 14 In particular, Aldrich consulted with
influential banking leader Paul Warburg who convinced Aldrich that, in
order to avoid future liquidity crises, the United States needed a central
bank that was controlled by private bankers and financial experts.' 5 This
plan could be patterned after the European system and utilize centralized
banking as well as currency backed by commercial assets-a combination
that the Commission believed would allow for quick liquidity. 16 Aldrich
and Warburg also concluded that the mandatory reserve requirement
should be increased to force banks to transform a maximum amount of
bank assets into cash without disturbing the general condition of the
economy. 17
The influential American Bankers Association responded positively to
the Aldrich Plan.' 8 Doubts, though, remained in Congress, especially after
Woodrow Wilson was elected President of the United States. Progressive
Democrats, including William Jennings Bryan, strongly opposed Aldrich's
plan because it placed the control of a central bank and monetary policy in
the hands of private bankers rather than the federal government.
11. JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 16-19.
12. Alrich-Vreeland Act of 1908, ch. 229, §§17-18, 35 Stat. 546, 552-53 (1908); see
also Whitehouse, supra note 5.
13. JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 17; see also Whitehouse, supra note 5.
14. ARTHUR B. SHELTON, NATIONAL MONETARY COMMISSION, S. Doc. No. 62-243,

at 4 (1912); JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 19.
15. See HARRY SIMONHOFF, SAGA OF AMERICAN JEWRY 1865-1914: LINKS OF AN
ENDLESS CHAIN 375, 377-79 (Arco Publishing Co. 1959); Whitehouse, supranote 5.
16. See S. Doc. No. 62-243, at 19-20, 27, 36-37; Whitehouse, supra note 5.
17. See S. Doc. No. 62-243, at 19-20; see generally Whitehouse, supra note 5.
18. ARTHUR S. LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 44 (1954).

19. See id. at 45-47.

20. JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 19-2 1.
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As an alternative to the Aldrich Plan, Representative Carter Glass of
Virginia proposed a solution that would add liquidity without utilizing a
central bank. 2 1 The Glass-Willis Plan called for twelve or more privately
owned regional banks that would perform central banking functions, such
as holding member banks' reserves and issuing currency backed by
commercial assets and gold.22 Basically, this was a decentralized version
of the Aldrich Plan.23
Ultimately, there was a compromise between the Aldrich Plan and the
Glass-Willis Plan that included the addition of a central board that
coordinated monetary policy through a series of regional reserve banks.24
This compromise plan called for exclusive government control of the
Federal Reserve Board and made currency printed by the Federal Reserve
an obligation of the United States government. 25 Though Representative
Glass still opposed a central bank, he agreed to the plan when President
Wilson insisted upon centralized public control. 26 Key leaders of the
powerful banking industry preferred a system that was controlled
exclusively by private interests and strongly opposed the compromise
plan.27
Despite the banking industry's opposition, President Wilson presented
the compromise plan to Congress on June 28, 1913.28 A few days later,
Glass sponsored the bill in the House of Representatives, and Senator
Robert Owen introduced an identical bill in the Senate.29
Progressive Democrats in the House sought federal supervision of the
Federal Reserve and remained skeptical of the bill.30 However, after
Representative William Jennings Bryan, a strong advocate of federal
control, threw his support behind the bill, the House of Representatives
by a vote of 285 to 85, with only
passed the bill on September 18, 1913,31
32
it.
against
voting
Democrats
three
21.Id. at22.
22. Id.
23. LINK, supra note 18, at 47.
24. JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 24-25.
25. Id. at 25.
26. Id. at 24.
27. Id. at 25-26.
28. LINK, supra note 18, at 48.
29. Id. at 49.
30. Id. at 50.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 50 & n.59; Money Bill Passes House, 285 to 85, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1913,
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The next hurdle for President Wilson and the Federal Reserve Act was
the Senate. 33 The Senate finally voted on the bill after six months of
debate, and numerous hearings between September 1, 1913, and October
25, 1913. 34
While the Senate debated the bill, Frank Vanderlip, a prominent New
York banker, proposed yet another variation of a central banking plan,
which consisted of one federally controlled Federal Reserve Bank with
twelve branches of reserve banks around the country. 35 Though the
Vanderlip Plan gained considerable support in the Senate and influenced
debate on the issue, in the end it lost out to the amended Federal Reserve
Act which did not include final federal government control.36
On December 19, 1913, with full Democratic support, the Senate
passed its amended version of the Federal Reserve Act by a vote of fiftyfour to thirty-four. 37 Since the House's version of the Federal Reserve Act
differed slightly from the version passed by the Senate, the bills were
submitted to a conference committee composed of members of both
chambers. 38 The conference committee incorporated various aspects of
both bills, and two days after the conference committee concluded its
39
work, both the House and the Senate approved the compromise version.
On December 23, 1913, Wilson signed the Federal Reserve Act into law.40
C. The Organizationof the FederalReserve
The history of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act demonstrates that there
was a common belief during that time that a change in the banking and
currency system was needed in order to bolster confidence and security in
the minds of Americans. It also highlighted the disagreements between
conservatives who advocated for as little government interference in the
banking system as possible, and progressives who sought a central
banking system controlled by the federal government. 4' In the end, the
parties compromised and established a system where the federal
33. JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 27, 31.
34. Id. at 32; LINK, supra note 18, at 51.
35. JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 32.
36. Id. at 33-34.
37. 63 CONG. REc. 1230 (1913); LINK, supra note 18, at 52 & n.63.
38. JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 34.
39. Id.
40. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913).
41. JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 17-19.
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government controlled the central Federal Reserve Board, but private
interests influenced the regional reserve banks. 4 2 This mix limits both the
private bankers' and the federal government's involvement in certain
functions and makes the Federal Reserve System "independent ...within
43

the government.,
Today, the Fed "assist[s] in achieving national economic goals" by
implementing monetary policy 44 and is comprised of a seven-member
Board of Governors, twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks, the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC), the Federal Advisory Council, and
numerous privately owned commercial banks.45 The members of the
Board of Governors are appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. 46 The FOMC is composed of the seven members of
the Board of Governors and five representatives who must be presidents or
first vice-presidents of Federal Reserve Banks.4 7 The representatives are
elected annually by the banks' Board of Directors.48
II.

THE LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

After its creation, the Fed continued to evolve through a series of

congressional acts that altered and, in many cases, expanded the Fed's
original scope of authority. Indeed, right up until 2008, the Fed continued
to acquire increasingly expansive powers despite the fact that its quasiprivate nature allowed it to operate under a veil of opacity. 49 The
42. See generally Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251

(1913).

43. The Federal Reserve Board, Frequently Asked Questions: Federal Reserve
System, http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/faq/faqfrs.htm (last visited Jan. 26,
2010).
44. Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
45. Id.; see 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (2006) (code sections pertaining to the Federal
Reserve System).
46. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006).
47. 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) (2006).
48. Id.
49. This is not to say that every congressional act since the 1913 Federal Reserve Act
has further expanded the Fed's powers or reduced its transparency. Indeed, though rare,
Congress has on occasion passed legislation that did the opposite. Take for instance the
Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-188, 91 Stat. 1387 (1970). The
main purpose of this Act was to make the Federal Reserve more accountable for its
actions regarding economic and monetary policy. Id.With this Act, the Federal Reserve
was now required to report its intentions for the future and the current status of the
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following examples demonstrate key pieces of legislation that expanded
the Fed's power.
A. The BankingAct of 1935
In 1935, Congress passed the Banking Act. 50 In addition to creating
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),5 ' the Act relocated the
Fed's headquarters to Washington, D.C. 52 Most significantly, however, the
Act assigned control of national monetary policy to the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors and the FOMC.53
To accomplish this, the Act made several changes. First, it established
that the Board of Governors would be comprised of seven members
appointed by the President and subject to confirmation by the Senate. 54 In
addition, the Board would no longer include the Comptroller of the
Currency or the Secretary of the Treasury as members.55 These changes
removed control of the banking system and monetary policy from the
federal government and concentrated it with the Fed.
The Act also decreased the autonomy of the twelve individual Federal
Reserve Banks. Prior to the Act, these banks were given broad discretion
over whether to participate in open market activities. 56 The Act changed
this by requiring them to engage in open market activities under the
direction of the FOMC.57 Ultimately, the Banking Act of 1935 expanded
the Fed's role as the central authority for banking industry oversight and
established the Fed as the lead monetary policymaker.

economy during monetary policy hearings before Congress. Id. § 202. These hearings
allowed Congress to have a more cohesive understanding of how the Federal Reserve's
monetary policy decisions and forecasts were affecting and would affect the United
States' economy. Ultimately, the Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977 made the Federal
Reserve more transparent.
50. Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, 49 Stat. 684 (1935).
51. Id. § 101; see R. W. HAFER, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYsTEM: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
24 (2005).
52. HAFER, supra note 51, at 24.

53. See id.
54. § 203(b), 49 Stat. at 704; see HAFER, supra note 51, at 24.
55. HAFER, supra note 51.
56. Ruess v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461,463 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
57. § 205, 49 Stat. at 705.
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B. FederalReserve-TreasuryDepartmentAccord of 1951
In 1942, at the request of the Treasury Department, the Fed voluntarily
agreed to maintain a low interest rate on government bonds so that the
United States could cheaply finance the war debt. 58 In order to maintain
the low interest rate, the Fed gave up control of the size of its portfolio as
59
well as the money supply.
After the war, President Harry Truman and the Treasury Department
sought to keep the interest rate low in order to protect the public's
investment in wartime bonds, as well as to contain inflationary measures
as the Korean War ensued. 60 This battle over control of interest rates and
monetary policy in general led to the 1951 Accord (the Accord). 61 By
eliminating the Fed's obligation to monetize Treasury Department debt at
a fixed rate,62 the Accord restored the Fed's independence63 and expanded
the Fed's powers. Yet again, the Fed was further removed from federal
control.
C. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
Before the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,64 banks formed
holding companies in order to own both banking and non-banking
businesses and geographically, to expand into areas where branch banking
was otherwise restricted.65 The 1956 Act ended this practice by
58. Allan Sproul, "The Accord"--A Landmark in the FirstFifty Years of the Federal
Reserve System, 46 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. MONTHLY REv. 227, 228 (Nov. 1964); The
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, The 50th Anniversary of the Treasury-Federal
Reserve Accord 1951-2001: Background, http://richmondfed.org/publications/research/
special reports/treasury fed accord/background/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
59. Sproul, supra note 58, at 228; The Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, supra
note 58.
60. Sproul, supra note 58, at 229-30; The Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, supra
note 58.
61. Sproul, supra note 58, at 230-33.
62. Press Release, Joint Announcement by the Sec'y of the Treasury and the
Chairman of the Board of Governors, and of the Fed. Open Market Comm., of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. (Mar. 4, 1951), http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research /special_
reports/treasury fed accord/historicaldocuments/pdf/accordannouncement_03_04_195
1.pdf.

63. Sproul, supra note 58, at 233.
64. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956).
65. Sproul, supra note 58, at 280; see also J. Nellie Liang & Donald T. Savage, The

Nonbank Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 76 FED. RESERVE BULL. 280, 280-81
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prohibiting bank holding companies from engaging in most non-banking
acquiring voting securities of certain non-banking
activities or
66
companies.
The Act also increased the Fed's power: by requiring each bank
holding company to register with the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve,67 the Act granted to the Fed's Board of Governors the
responsibility of regulating and supervising bank holding company
activities. 6 8 In particular, the Board of Governors was given the power to
regulate activities in the areas of banking, finance, or insurance as long as
they were closely related to the business of banking or the management or
control of banks. 69 Ultimately, the 1956 Act afforded the Fed broad power
and discretion over all institutions that have any control over or influence
in the banking system, not just banks themselves.
D. The InternationalBankingAct of 1978
The International Banking Act of 197870 was passed in order to
promote competitive equality between foreign and domestic banks,
improve federal control over monetary policy, and provide a federal
presence in the regulation and supervision of foreign bank activities inside
the United States. In order to achieve these goals, the Act placed foreign
banks and domestic corporations that conduct business with foreign
financial operations under the supervision of the Fed; 72 the Fed's scope of
authority was again expanded.
E. The Full Employment and BalancedGrowth Act of 1978
Congress passed the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of
197873 in response to America's fear of a recession in light of high
(Jan. 1990).
66. §§ 3-4, 70 Stat. at 134-37; Liang & Savage, supra note 65, at 281.
67. §§ 3-4, 70 Stat. at 134-37; Liang & Savage, supra note 65, at 201.
68. See Liang & Savage, supra note 65, at 281.
69. § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. at 137.
70. See International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
71. John P. Segala, A Summary of the InternationalBanking Act of 1978, 5 FED. RES.
BANKOF RICHMOND ECON. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1979, at 16, 18-19.
72. § 4, 92 Stat. at 610-13; Segala, supra note 71, at 19.
73. Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-523, 92 Stat.
1887 (1978).

2010] THE ILLEGAL ACTIONS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE

119

inflation and unemployment rates. 74 Instead of the singular goal of full
employment, as set forth in the Employment Act of 1946, the 1978 Act set
forth several economic goals, including full employment, production
75
growth, price stability, trade balance, and a balanced budget.
Specifically, the Act required the Fed to establish a monetary policy that
encouraged long-run growth, minimized inflation, and promoted price
stability. 76 It also integrated the monetary policy of the Fed with the
economic policy of the President. 77 Through these changes, Congress
created a situation in which the Fed exercised a more direct presence in
and greater influence over the national economy and its long-term goals.
F. DepositoryInstitutions Deregulationand Monetary ControlAct of 1980
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
198078 changed the country's monetary policy and deregulated the
banking system. Under the Act, all banks, including credit unions and
savings and loan companies, were allowed to access the Federal Reserve
Discount Window 79 in order to obtain credit advances. 80 In return, all
banking institutions in the United States were essentially required to abide
by the Fed's rules and policies. 8 1 The end result was to expand the Fed's
power over both America's banking industry and the economy in general.
G. The FederalDepositInsurance CorporationImprovement Act of 1991
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
199182 was passed in response to the thrift industry crisis. It significantly

74. See COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
201-03 (1984), availableat http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications /ERP/issue/1 387/.
75. § 102, 92 Stat. at 1890-92.
76. Id. § 2(c), 92 Stat. at 1889.
77. Id.
78. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
79. For a description of the Federal Reserve Discount Window, see BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES &

45-46 (2005).
80. § 103(b)(7), 94 Stat. at 136.
81. Id. §§ 102-03, 94 Stat. at 132-38.
82. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 199 1, Pub. L. No.
102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991).

FUNCTIONS
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increased the powers and authority of the FDIC.83 In addition, the Act
included a subsection known as the Foreign Bank Supervision
Enhancement Act of 1991.84 This provision enhanced the Fed's authority
85
to supervise foreign banks entering the United States banking system.
Foreign banks could no longer establish a branch or agency in the United
States without first being approved by the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors. 86 By requiring this approval, the Act strengthened the Fed's
ability to examine and supervise foreign banking and further expanded the
Fed's influence over the American banking industry and economy.
H. Gramm-Leach-BlileyAct of 1999
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 is a far-reaching, complex law
that covers many aspects of the banking industry, from mergers of
institutions, to protection of private consumer information. 87 It was passed
under the auspices of modernizing the United States financial services
industry. 88 It removed the prohibitions on cross ownership of banks,
securities firms, and insurance companies that were established by the
Banking Act of 1933,89 and it permitted commercial banks to underwrite
own insurance companies through federally regulated
securities and
90
subsidiaries.
The Act also established the Fed as the regulator of these banks and
their subsidiaries, known as financial holding institutions. 91 It gave the Fed
and the Treasury Department the right to veto each other's decisions on
newly acquired financial powers. 92 However, more than anything else, the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 significantly expanded the Fed's
power-the Fed's authority grew to include the broad category of
financial holding institutions, which included banks, securities firms, and
insurance companies.
83. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Important Banking Legislation,
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/ laws/important/index.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
84. Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105
Stat. 2286 (1991).

85. See id.
86.Id.

87. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
88. See generally id.

89. Id.

90. Id. § 121, 113 Stat. at 1373.

91. Id.

92. Id. § 103(a), 113 Stat. at 1342.
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I. The Emergency Economic StabilizationAct of 2008
Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
as a response to the subprime mortgage crisis in an effort to bail out the
United States financial system. 93 The Act allowed the federal government
to purchase and insure certain types of troubled assets for the purpose of
providing stability and preventing disruption to the country's economic
growth. 94 It authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish the
Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) in order to purchase troubled
assets from any financial institution. 95 In addition, the Act directed the
Federal Reserve Board and other housing and finance agencies to take a
variety of actions, including modifying
the terms of mortgage loans and
96
reducing the number of foreclosures.

The Act also allowed the Fed to pay banks a high rate of interest on
deposits held as reserve beginning October 1, 2008,7 instead of 2011, as
specified by prior law. 9 8 The Congressional Budget Office estimated that
over the next three years, the exercise of this provision will reduce the
Fed's payments of its profits, which are considered revenue to the
Treasury Department in the federal budget. 99 Through the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, the Fed has become an integral part
of rescuing the United States economy from both current and future
instability.
With the passage of this Act, the Fed's power was at an apex in terms
of scope and authority. From its original role as a central bank primarily
focused on monetary policy, the Fed became a gatekeeper over much of
the nation's financial system and one of the nation's most expansive
economic regulators. Yet, even with these broad powers, the Fed did not
possess unlimited authority. As the current economic crisis began to
unfold, it became clear that the Fed did not understand these limitations.
93. See generally Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
94. Id. §§ 101-02.
95. Id. § 101.
96. Id.§§ 102, 109.
97. Id. § 128; Letter from Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office, to
the Honorable Barney Frank, Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of
Representatives (Sept. 28, 2008), availableat http://cboblog.cbo.gov/?p=173.
98. Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 203,
120 Stat. 1969 (2006).
99. Orszag, supra note 97.
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Rather than operating within its legislative bounds, the Fed soon
commenced a series of initiatives that fell squarely outside of its
regulatory authority.
11.

THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S ROLE IN THE ONGOING ECONOMIC CRISIS

On February 1, 2006, Ben Bernanke was sworn in as chairman of the
Fed to replace the retiring Alan Greenspan. 00 Prior to becoming
Chairman, Bernanke held a variety of academic positions and served as a
member of the Fed's Board of Governors from 2002 to 2005. 0l l Widely
considered a surprise choice by President George W. Bush, Bernanke was
nevertheless expected to continue many of the laissez-faire, free-market
10 2
policies that defined much of Alan Greenspan's terms as Fed Chairman.
This expectation, however, should have been balanced with the fact that
one of Bernanke's most renowned areas of study and analysis is the Great
Depression. 10 3 Based on his research, Bernanke concluded that the Great
Depression had been exacerbated by the Fed's adherence to orthodox
policy. 104 More than anything else, Bernanke's belief that extraordinary
measures could have mitigated the Great Depression foreshadowed the
extremely market-intrusive measures that the Fed would take as the
current crisis unfolded. In response to the crisis, the Bernanke-led Fed
engaged in a series of unprecedented regulatory maneuvers. These ranged
from an adjustment of existing Fed programs to the creation of entirely
new ones.

100. Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Feb. 1, 2006),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20060201a.htm (last visited Jan.
26, 2010).
101. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, Biography of Ben S. Bernanke,
Chairman, http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/bernanke.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
102. Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 in Transition-From Boom to Bust and Into the
Future, 81 AM. BANK. L.J. 375, 400 (2007); Edmund L. Andrews et al., At the Fed, an
Oct.
26,
2005,
Choice, N.Y.
TIMES,
Unknown
Became a Safe
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/business/26fed.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
103. For an example of Bernanke's work, see Ben S. Bernanke, The Macroeconomics
of the Great Depression: A ComparativeApproach, 27 J. MONEY, CREDr & BANK. 1

(1995).
104. Id. at 4; Andrews et al., supra note 102.
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A. The Adjustment of Existing Programs
In the beginning of 2007, early indications of a subprime mortgage
crisis began to percolate to the surface.' 05 One of the key problems was the
unanticipated increase of delinquencies in this segment of the mortgage
industry.l°6 Despite the growing number of failed subprime mortgages and
the May 2007 bankruptcy of New Century Financial Corp., a major
subprime lender, Bernanke continued to argue that the problem of
subprime mortgages did not represent a risk to the financial system as a
whole: "We believe the effect of the troubles in the subprime sector on the
broader housing market will likely be limited, and we do not expect
significant spillovers from the subprime market to the rest of the economy
or to the financial system."' 10 7 Even as late as August 7, 2007, the Fed
refused to reduce its federal funds rate-a key Fed program that promotes
market liquidity through overnight inter-bank lending.' 0 8 By refusing to
reduce the federal funds rate, the Fed signaled that no change in market
liquidity was necessary.
The Fed's refusal to act, however, was short-lived. Indeed, only ten
days later, the Fed reversed course and cut the Primary Credit Rateanother key interest rate-by one half of 1 percent.' °9 Throughout the fall
of 2007, the Fed continued to reduce these rates, eventually cutting the
federal funds rate to 4.25 percent by December 2007.110
Despite these rapid interest rate cuts, the threats facing the economy
continued to grow rather than contract. It became clear that the Fed would
have to take more dramatic steps to increase liquidity in the financial
system."' The Fed's next step would be to establish a series of new
liquidity programs.
105. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, The Subprime Mortgage Market National
and Twelfth District Developments, in 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 6, 6 (2009),

http://www.frbsf.org/publications/federalreserve/annual /2007/2007annualreport.pdf.
106. Id.

107. Daniel Wagner, Key Moments During Bernanke's First Term as Fed Chairman
Show Evolution, Bold Action, THE WASH. EXAMINER, Aug. 26, 2009, http://www.wash

ingtonexaminer.com/politics/ap/54944392.html.
108. Alister Bull, Timeline: Fed Actions to Boost Activity, REUTERS, Mar. 17, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSNI 755626820080317?virtualBrandChannel= 1011 &
pageNumber=2. The federal fund rate was 5.25 percent at the time. Id.
109. See id.
110. Id.

111. At the same time, the federal government, through both the Treasury Department
and Congress, was implementing a variety of relief programs aimed at addressing the
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B. The Creationof New Programs
In December 2007, the Fed created the Term Auction Facility-one 112
of
its first new programs aimed at addressing the economic challenges.
This program was designed to inject liquidity into the financial system; the
Fed would auction funds to qualified depository institutions, and a broad
array of assets would be eligible to serve as collateral for these auctioned
loans. 1 3 At the same time, the FOMC announced plans to increase
liquidity on an international scale through currency swap4 arrangements
with the Swiss National Bank and European Central Bank.'
These dramatic measures still failed to slow down the growing crisis,
so, on March 11, 2008, the Fed created another new program-the Term
Securities Lending Facility. The program would lend up to $200 billion
worth of liquidity to approved recipients, with a broad array of public and
private securities qualifying as collateral. 115 During this time, the Fed
6
continued to reduce its interest rates to promote lending and liquidity."
Even with these measures, the pervasive nature of the crisis was
unrelenting. The scope of the problem continued to grow during March
2008, and the Fed was forced to intercede to prevent the failure of Bear
Stearns-a move that would ultimately serve as one of the clearest
7
examples of the Fed acting outside the scope of its legislative authority."1
Going forward, the Fed continued to announce new and expanded
programs that were designed to increase liquidity in the financial system.
The Fed lowered interest rates to essentially zero percent," 8 accepted even
growing amount of mortgage defaults and the overall financial problems that they were
causing. For more information on these programs, see Chad D. Emerson, A Troubled
House of Cards:Examining How the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 Fails
to Resolve the ForeclosureCrisis,61 OKLA. L. REv. 561, 569-84 (2008).
112. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, The Financial Crisis: A Timeline of Events
and Policy Actions, http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cftn?p=timeline (last visited Jan.
26, 2010).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. For a discussion of the Fed's role in the Bear Steams matter, see infra Part IV.B.
118. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Credit and Liquidity
Programs and the Balance Sheet, The Federal Reserve's Response to the Crisis,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst-crisisresponse.htm (last visited Jan.
26, 2010).
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more types of loan collateral, 19 and ultimately provided a bailout for
American International Group (AIG). 12 Many of these actions, while
unprecedented in nature, were within the expanded authority that Congress
had given the Fed over the last half-century. This, however, was not
uniformly the case.
IV. THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S ILLEGAL EXPANSION
OF ITS ECONOMIC AUTHORITY

With these new and expanded programs, the Fed unquestionably
implemented an aggressive series of actions in response to the current
economic crisis. While the effectiveness of these programs is subject to
great debate, in many cases their actual legality is not. Although the Fed
has a broad array of powers, including a set of emergency powers that
further increase its ability to expand existing programs and develop new
ones in certain situations, the powers of the Fed are not unlimited.
In responding to the current crisis, the Fed exceeded its statutory
limitations. The Fed initiated several programs that fall outside the broad
scope of authority that Congress granted to it. It engaged in activities
which are impermissible under the 1913 enabling act and subsequent
amendments.121 It has broken the law.
A. The FederalReserve's Limited Authority to PurchasePrivateAssets
To fully understand how the Fed exceeded its authority in responding
to the current financial crisis, one must make a distinction between two
types of assets: public assets and private assets. Public assets are those
either originating from or fully guaranteed by the government. They may
come in the form of bonds issued by the government itself or through
bonds or other obligations issued by a third-party, but fully backed by the
government. All other assets are private.
In addition, one must also distinguish between two types of
transactions: loans and purchases. The Federal Reserve Act gives the Fed
119. Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, (Oct. 25,
2008), http://federal reserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080914a.htm (last visited
Jan. 26, 2010).
120. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Credit and Liquidity
Programs and the Balance Sheet, Support for Specific Institutions, http://www.fed
eralreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bstsupport specific.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
121. See supra Part I.

126

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:109

the power to engage in both loans and purchases, but does so in
significantly different ways. For instance, the Fed has the power to
provide loans to private parties when those loans are backed by
collateral.122 In particular, the Fed may regularly provide loans to
commercial banks (also known as depository institutions), 123 and it may
provide loans to non-commercial banks in limited emergency situations. 24
Although the Fed may purchase certain obligations outright, 125 the
power to purchase assets is much more limited in scope than the power to
provide loans. In particular, section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act outlines
the narrow scope of the Fed's authority to make purchases. Section
14(b)(1) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, any bonds, notes,
or other obligations which are direct obligations of the United States or
which are fully guaranteed by the United States as to principal and
interest may be bought
and sold without regard to maturities but only in
26
the open market.'

In addition, section 14(b)(2) permits the Fed to purchase assets not only
backed by the United States directly, but also those guaranteed by a
United States government agency. 127 This means that all purchases made
by the Fed, as opposed to loans issued by the Fed, are limited to those
obligations in which principal and interest are either owned by the United
States or fully guaranteed by it or one of its agencies. Noticeably missing
from this authority
is the power of the Fed to purchase privately owned
28
assets outright. 1
The Act does provide the Fed with more expansive powers in certain
emergency situations:
122. For a detailed discussion of the scope and history of the Fed's lending powers, see

David H. Small & James A. Clouse, The Scope of Monetary Policy Actions Authorized
under the Federal Reserve Act, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2004/200440/
200440pap.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
123. Id. at 10.
124. MARC LABONTE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FINANCIAL TURMOIL:
COMPARING THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM TO THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S

RESPONSE 1 (2008), availableat http://www.fas.org/ sgp/crs/misc/RS22966.pdf.
125. Id. at 17.
126.Federal Reserve Act § 14(b)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 355(1) (2006).
127.Federal Reserve Act § 14(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 355(2) (2006) ("[The Fed may also
purchase] any obligation which is a direct obligation of, or fully guaranteed as to
principal and interest by, any agency of the United States.").
128. Privately owned assets are neither issued by the federal government nor generally
guaranteed by the government.
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In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five
members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods
as the said board may determine, at rates established in accordance with
the provisions of section 357 of this Title, to discount for any
individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of
exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are endorsed
or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank:
Provided, That before discounting any such note, draft, or bill of
exchange for an individual or partnership or corporation the Federal
reserve bank shall obtain evidence that such individual, partnership, or
corporation is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from
other banking institutions. All such discounts for individuals,
partnerships, or corporations shall be subject to such limitations,
restrictions, and regulations as the
29 Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System may prescribe.1

A careful review of these emergency powers reveals that the Fed exceeded
even this increased authority with its recent actions. For instance, the
emergency section applies only to the discounting of notes, drafts, and
bills of exchange in unusual and exigent circumstances. Nowhere does the
section provide the Fed with authority to purchase private assets. As a
result, under the Federal Reserve Act, the Fed cannot purchase notes or
drafts that do not comport with section 14.130 Significantly, the section 14
authority to purchase private bills of exchange is significantly limited in
scope and duration-generally less than ninety days.' 1
These clear limits on the Fed's purchasing powers were succinctly
stated by two members of the Board of Governors: "There is no express
provision in the Federal Reserve Act for the Federal Reserve to use its
open-market authority to purchase private-sector promissory notes such as
mortgages or corporate bonds or to purchase equities."' 32 Nevertheless, as
the current economic crisis grew, the Fed decided that the danger posed to
the financial system as a whole warranted actions that were beyond the
Fed's actual authority. The clearest examples of this extra-legal conduct
are the Fed's actions in response to the looming failures of investment
bank Bear Steams and worldwide financial company AIG.

129. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
130. LABONTE, supra note 124, at 1; see generally David Small & James Clouse, The
Limits the Federal Reserve Act Places on the Monetary Policy Actions of the Federal
Reserve, 19 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 553, 574 (2000).
131. See 12 U.S.C. § 344 (2006).
132. Small & Clouse, supranote 122, at 4.
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B. The FederalReserve's ImproperEquity Interests in PrivateEntities
In the cases of Bear Steams and AIG, the Fed acted outside the scope
of its statutory authority by effectively purchasing assets that did not fall
within the narrow purchase authority provided by the Federal Reserve
" Essentially, the Fed attempted to use legal trickery to disguise its
Act.' 33
illegal purchases of private assets from these companies. As one
commentator described the situation:
[T]he Fed's assistance in the Bear Steams merger with JPMorgan
Chase took a form that has some similarities to the TARP proposal. In
the case of Bear Steams, the Fed created a limited liability corporation
called Maiden Lane, and lent Maiden Lane $28.82 billion. Maiden
Lane used the proceeds of that loan and another loan from JPMorgan
Chase to purchase mortgage-related assets from Bear Steams. Thus,
although the Fed created and controlled Maiden Lane, the assets were
purchased and held by Maiden Lane, not the Fed. Similar to TARP,
Maiden Lane plans to hold the assets until markets recover, and
34 then
sell the assets to repay its loans to the Fed and JPMorgan Chase.'

The Fed created a wholly-controlled limited liability company (LLC) to
engage in purchase activities that the Fed was barred from doing itself by
the Federal Reserve Act.' 35 In fact, the Fed implicitly admitted as much in
later disclosures: "Maiden Lane LLC (ML LLC) was formed to facilitate
the merger of the Bear Steams Companies, Inc. and JPMorgan Chase &
Co. The New York Fed
extended credit to ML LLC to acquire certain
136
Steams.'
assets of Bear
Despite this statement, the Fed went on to claim that by "loaning"
money to Maiden Lane to purchase Bear assets, rather than purchasing the
assets directly from Bear Steams, it somehow complied with the Federal
Reserve Act: the transaction constituted a lending activity for which the
Fed has broad rights, rather than a purchasing activity. 37 As one
133. See generally LABONTE, supra note 124 (discussing the purchases); see also supra
notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
134. LABONTE, supra note 124, at 4.
135.Federal Reserve Act, §§ 13(3), 14(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. §§ 343, 355(2) (2006).
Technically, the owner of the Maiden Lane entities was the New York Federal Reserve
Bank rather than the Fed itself. However, that is a distinction without significance, since
both entities are subject to the private purchase restrictions of the Federal Reserve Act.
See Federal Reserve Act § 14(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 355(2) (2006).
136.Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Maiden Lane Transactions,
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/ maidenlane.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
137. See generally id.
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commentator noted, this is not an accurate description of the actual
transaction: "From an economic perspective, this complex arrangement is
functionally identical to a purchase of the Bear portfolio by the Fed--one
in small part by the subordinated $1 billion loan from
that's financed
' 38
JPMorgan."'
Another problem with this scheme is that nowhere in the Federal
Reserve Act did Congress provide authority for the Fed to create
subsidiary corporate entities as it did with Maiden Lane.' 39 The Fed cannot
simply establish off-the-books shadow companies to avoid its restrictions
under the Act. The legislative power of Congress cannot be circumvented
by merely creating a LLC.
The Fed used two other Maiden Lane LLCs'4 ° to divert Fed funds into
impermissible AIG equity investments. Known as Maiden Lane II and
Maiden Lane 111,141 these LLCs were created by the Fed to purchase credit
default swaps and mortgage securities from AIG; the diminished value of
these assets was burdening the company to the point that its continued
ability to operate was in question.' 42 While the Fed did not pay AIG
directly, it essentially purchased assets from AIG-the Fed system was the
true owner of the Maiden Lane entities. 143 As with the Bear Steams
transaction, the Fed's attempt to conceal an illegal purchase of AIG assets
through the use of a wholly-controlled LLC is, at best, a surreptitious
attempt to circumvent the meaning of the Federal Reserve Act and, at
worst, an intentional and purposeful violation of the law.

138. Peter Coy, Where No Fed Has Gone Before, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 26, 2008, http://
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_14/b4078000069548.htm (last visited Jan.
26, 2010).
139. Id; see also Federal Reserve Act §§ 13(3), 14(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. §§ 343, 355(2)
(2006).
140. Whatever the Fed possesses in brazenness it apparently lacks in naming
creativity-the term "Maiden Lane" appears to have been selected because it is the name
of the street on which the New York Federal Reserve Bank is located. Mark Pittman,
Bear, AIG Dumped $74 Billion in Subprime, CDOs on Fed (Update I), BLOOMBERG, Apr.
24, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aP2XyOHiRSGI.
141. See generally Federal Reserve Bank of New York, supra note 136.
142. Id.; see also Posting of Andrew Ross Sorkin to Dealbook Blog, http://deal
book.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/03/aig-and-us-in-deal-to-terminate-some-debt-obligatio
ns/ (Dec. 3, 2008, 7:22 EST).
143. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, supra note 136. ("The New York Fed has all
material control rights over the Asset Portfolio and is the sole and managing member of
ML LLC.").
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C. The Federal Reserve's Overall Ineffective Response to the Current
Crisis
The impropriety of the Fed's response to the current economic crisis is
paralleled only by the Fed's ineffective work leading up to the crisis.
Indeed, the Fed's decision to exceed its legislative authority was, in large
part, the result of its failure to act proactively in preventing, or at least
mitigating, the crisis in the first place. The scope of the Fed's failure to
comprehend the extent of the looming economic crisis is evidenced by a
review of the actual public statements made by the Fed leading up to the
crisis, especially those made by Chairman Bernanke.
Considering the great amount of power that his office possesses,
Chairman Bemanke is in a special position to inform the public as to the
state of the economy. 144 Moreover, when he addresses the public, his
statements typically represent the official views of the Fed. 14 5 In the
present crisis, this has been problematic, because he has repeatedly failed
to comprehend the scope and extent of the crisis.
Consider the following statements made by Mr. Bernanke as the crisis
unfolded:
July 2005

INTERVIEWER: Ben, there's been a lot of talk about a
housing bubble, particularly, you know [inaudible] from all sorts of
places. Can you give us your view as to whether or not there is a
housing bubble out there?
BERNANKE: Well, unquestionably, housing prices are up
quite a bit; I think it's important to note that fundamentals are also very
strong. We've got a growing economy, jobs, incomes. We've got very
low mortgage rates. We've got demographics supporting housing
growth. We've got restricted supply in some places. So it's certainly
understandable that prices would go up some. I don't know whether
prices are exactly where they should be, but I think it's fair to say that
much of what's happened is supported by the strength of the economy.
July 2005
INTERVIEWER: Tell me, what is the worst-case scenario?
Sir, we have so many economists coming on our air and saying, "Oh,
this is a bubble, and it's going to burst, and this is going to be a real
issue for the economy." Some say it could even cause a recession at
some point. What is the worst-case scenario, if in fact we were to see
prices come down substantially across the country?
144. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 225(b) (2006).
145. See generally id.
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BERNANKE: Well, I guess I don't buy your premise. It's a
pretty unlikely possibility. We've never had a decline in house prices
on a nationwide basis. So what I think is more likely is that house
prices will slow, maybe stabilize: might slow consumption spending a
bit. I don't think it's going to drive the economy too far from its full
employment path, though.
INTERVIEWER: So would you agree with Alan Greenspan's
comments recently that we've got some areas of the country that are
seeing froth, not necessarily a national situation, but certainly froth in
some areas?
BERNANKE: You can see some types of speculation:
investors turning over condos quickly. Those sorts of things you see in
some local areas. I'm hopeful-I'm confident, in fact, that the bank
regulators will pay close attention to the kinds of loans that are being
made, and make sure that underwriting is done right. But I do think this
is mostly a localized problem, and not something that's going to affect
the national economy.
November 2006
BERNANKE: This scenario envisions that consumer
spending, supported by rising incomes and the recent decline in energy
prices, will continue to grow near its trend rate and that the drag on the
economy from the [inaudible] housing sector will gradually diminish.
The motor vehicles sector may already be showing signs of
strengthening. After having cut production significantly in recent
months, in response to the rise in inventory of unsold vehicles,
automakers appear to have boosted the assembly rate a bit in
November, and they have scheduled further increases for December.
The effects of the housing correction on real economic activity are
likely to persist into next year, as I've already noted. But the rate of
decline in home construction should slow as the inventory of unsold
new homes is gradually worked down.
February 2007
BERNANKE: We expect moderate growth going forward. We
believe that if the housing sector begins to stabilize, and if some of the
inventory corrections still going on in manufacturing begin to be
completed, that there's a reasonable possibility that we'll see some
strengthening in the economy sometime during the middle of the new
year. Our assessment is that there's not much indication at this point
that subprime mortgage issues have spread into the broader mortgage
market, which still seems to be healthy. And the lending side of that
still seems to be healthy.
July 2007
BERNANKE: The pace of home sales seems likely to remain
sluggish for a time, partly as a result of some tightening in lending
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standards, and the recent increase in mortgage interest rates. Sales
should ultimately be supported by growth in income and employment,
as well as by mortgage rates that, despite the recent increase, remain
fairly low relative to historical norms. However, even if demand
stabilizes as we expect, the pace of construction will probably fall
somewhat further, as builders work down the stocks of unsold new
homes. Thus, declines in residential construction will likely continue to
weigh on economic growth in coming quarters, although the magnitude
of the drag on growth should diminish over time. The global economy
continues to be strong, supported by solid economic growth abroad.
U.S. exports should expand further in coming quarters. Overall, the
U.S. economy seems likely to expand at a moderate pace over the
a bit in 2008 to a
second half of 2007, with growth then strengthening
46
rate close to the economy's underlying trend. 1

Clearly, the Bernanke-led Fed repeatedly failed to recognize the severity
and scope of the current economic crisis. This failure indicates a lack of
overall competence in the execution of its legislative authoritysomething that impugns any deference it might receive in expansively
interpreting its regulatory powers.
In no uncertain terms, the Fed failed in its efforts to recognize and
measure the crisis in advance, as well as implement effective policy and
programmatic responses. Individually, these failures damage the Fed's
efficacy. Taken together, they evidence a systemic failure of the central
bank. At the very least, this should provoke Congress to vigorously
investigate the extent to which the Fed itself was a contributor to the
severity of this crisis.
Unfortunately, the opacity of the Fed's actions is so cloudy that it is
able to prevent a comprehensive examination of these practices. The Fed's
ability to obscure an in-depth review of its illegal equity purchase
activities provides the most convincing evidence in support of an initial,
a comprehensive
but significant step toward resolving this obfuscation:
47
Congressional audit of the Federal Reserve System. 1
146. These quotes are taken from a transcript of a video compilation of statements by
Ben Bernanke. The transcript can be found at Mises Daily, Ben Bernanke Was Incredibly,
Uncannily Wrong, http://mises.org/story/3588 (last visited Jan. 26, 2010). The original
video can be found at http://www.youtube. com/watch?v=HQ79Pt2GNJo.
147. Recently, Chairman Bernanke publicly called for the Government Accountability
Office to conduct a "full review" of the Fed's activities related to the AIG bailout. See
Bernanke Asks GAO to Review Fed's AIG Bailout, MSNBC, Jan. 29, 2010, http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/34939495/ns/business-usbusiness/. While this may constitute some
step towards transparency, it falls woefully short. Not only is the review limited to a
single transaction, Chairman Bemanke fails to define what constitutes a "full review."
Whatever Chairman Bernanke's motives, this development is at best a piecemeal step
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V. THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AND INDEPENDENT
AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE

Though the Fed's illegal equity purchase activities are evident in a
macro sense, the precise details of this malfeasance is difficult to expose,
especially because Congress currently does not possess the power to
comprehensively audit the Fed.' 48 This is true despite the fact that the Fed
has the ability to control the monetary policy of the United States. The Fed
can essentially make the federal government responsible for unlimited
financial obligations through its loan and purchase powers. 149 At the same
time, the Fed has historically been able to shield itself from complete and
independent audits of its activities.
From the Federal Reserve Board's inception in 1913 until 1933, the
federal government maintained a limited authority to audit some of its
functions. 150 The 1933 Banking Act eliminated most of this authority
leaving only a very narrow swath of audit authority. 151
It was not until the late 1970s that Congress restored the federal
government's ability to engage in broader audits of the Fed's activities.
This renewed authority arose out of the Federal Banking Agency Audit
(FBAA) Act, which Congress passed in 1978.152 One of the main purposes
153
of the FBAA Act was to expand congressional oversight over the Fed.
The Act empowered the Government Accounting Office (GAO) with
"authority to audit the Board of Governors [and] Reserve Banks ....
,,15
However, the Act was not as effective as it could have been-it
specifically prohibited the GAO or any other independent entity from
that is too narrowly crafted to effectively address the underlying issues discussed in the
following section.
148. See PAULINE SMALE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, STRUCTURE AND

FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 6 (2005), availableat http://www.policy

archive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/3436/RS20826_20050615.pdfseq uence= 1.
149. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 343, 355(2); supra Part IV.A.
150. H.R. 2176, A Bill to Amend the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the H. Comm.
On Government Operations, 95th Cong. 3 (1977) (statement of Ellsworth H. Morse, Jr.,
Asst. Comptroller of the United States), available at http://archive.gao.gov/fl102a/
100319.pdf.
151. Id.
152. Federal Banking Agency Audit Act of 1978, Pub. L. No 95-320, 92 Stat. 391
(1978) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 714 (2006)).
153. SMALE, supra note 148, at 6.
154. Id.
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auditing several other critical areas of Fed activity. The FBAA Act, as
currently codified, provides that:
Audits of the Federal Reserve Board and Federal reserve banks may not
include-(1) transactions for or with a foreign central bank, government of a foreign country, or nonprivate international
financing organization
(2) deliberations, decisions, or actions on monetary policy
matters, including discount window operations, reserves
of member banks, securities credit, interest on deposits,
and open market operations;
(3) transactions made under the direction of the Federal Open
Market Committee; or
(4) a part of a discussion or communication among or between members of the Board of Governors and officers
and employees of the Federal Reserve
System related to
55
clauses (1)-(3) of this subsection. 1

These exceptions are problematic, because they include the sources of the
Fed's faulty decisions, including the illegal equity purchases, made in
response to the present economic crisis. The inability of any independent
agency to audit the Fed's monetary actions and transactions with most
foreign entities, as well as the activities of the FOMC, prevents a detailed
review of the Fed's unprecedented actions in this matter. The result is a
glaring "blind spot" in the government's ability to audit the agency that
has the ability to bind it to near unlimited financial obligations.
In response to the argument that the Fed faces little to no oversight, the
Fed points to the Inspector General Act of 1978, which authorizes the
Inspector General of the Federal Reserve System to engage in reviews of
56
the areas that the FBAA Act prevents the GAO from auditing.'
However, this authority is insufficient for two reasons. First, the Fed's
Inspector General, while certainly professing independence, is
nevertheless still a part of the Federal Reserve System. As such, no matter
how it is conducted, any audit by the Fed's Inspector General is simply a
self-audit by the Fed. This in no way equates to an independent audit.
Worse still, by the Inspector General's own admission, the power of
the office to review the areas excluded from the GAO's audit jurisdiction
is limited and subject to the final authority of the Fed itself:
The Board's OIG is also authorized to audit and investigate the
monetary policy programs and operations of the Board. However, this
155. 31 U.S.C. § 714 (2006).
156. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978).
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access can be limited, in part, by section 8G(g)(3) of the IG Act. These
provisionsstate that the Board'sIG may be placed under the direction
and control of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, if such
control is necessary to prevent the disclosure of any information
concerning decisions or deliberations on policy matters, the disclosure
of which could reasonably be expected to have a significant influence
on the economy or market behavior, or if such disclosure would
constitute a serious threat to national security. In these cases, the
agency head has the ability to prohibit such an audit or investigation,
if the agency head determines that such prohibition is necessary to
prevent5 7significant impairment to the national interests of the United
States. 1

The acknowledgment that the Fed has final discretion over the auditing
power given to the Inspector General evidences the true inability for any
entity-internal or external-to engage in an independent and
comprehensive audit of the Fed's full range of activities. The GAO has
some limited authority, and the Fed's Inspector General also has some
limited authority. Neither entity, though, has absolute auditing power. This
gap in auditing coverage allows the Fed to ultimately prevent a full review
of the complete details behind its response to the current financial crisis.
Ultimately, because of the Fed's conduct, the federal government finds
itself obligated on purchases for which Congress did not provide any
budgetary appropriation. As one commentator described the situation:
If this case proves anything, it's that the Fed is ready to press the limits
of its charter to keep the financial system afloat. Effectively acquiring
the Bear [Steams] assets at a bargain price and then liquidating them is
similar to what Resolution Trust Corp. did when it shut down savings
and loans and auctioned off their loan portfolios in the 1990s. The
difference is that 15Congress
set up the RTC but had nothing to do with
8
the Fed's moves.

In response to this untenable situation, Representative Ron Paul of
Texas introduced the Federal Reserve Transparency Act, 159 and Senator
Bernie Sanders of Vermont introduced the Federal Reserve Sunshine Act
of 2009.160 Both acts would provide the federal government with the
157. The Role of Inspectors General: Minimizing and Mitigating Waste, Fraud,and
Abuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm.
on Financial Services, 111 th Cong. 11 (2009) (statement of Elizabeth A. Coleman,
Inspector General, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (emphasis added),
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing /financialsvcs-dem/coleman-testimonypdf"
158. Coy, supra note 138.
159. Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2009, H.R. 1207, 111 th Cong. (2009).
160. Federal Reserve Sunshine Act of 2009, S. 604, 111 th Cong. (2009).
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authority to engage in a comprehensive and independent audit of the Fed's
activities, including those related to the current financial crisis.
The importance of this authority is evidenced by the strong bicongressional support that both bills have received. Indeed, as of
September 2009, Representative Paul's bill had 290 co-sponsors-more
than enough to secure a vote before the full 435-member House of
In addition, the legislation is largely bi-partisan--over
Representatives.
100 of the co-sponsors of Republican Paul's bill are Democrats.162 Senator
Sanders' bill has likewise generated bi-partisan support, with 27 sponsors
as of September 2009.163
If Congress were to pass these bills, the GAO could engage in a
complete and independent audit of the Fed's activities, both generally and
specifically related to its current, unprecedented programs. The audit
would include a comprehensive review of the details related to the Fed's
illegal equity purchases in the transactions involving Bear Steams and
AIG.164 The usefulness of such a review was succinctly explained by one
commentator: The "particular confluence of the ugly and the unknown
why we need an outside, independent
[the Maiden Lane LLCs], is exactly
' 65
Reserve."'
Federal
audit of the
Protests by the Fed and its supporters that such authority would
infringe upon the Fed's independence are unfounded, as the audits could
be structured to narrowly review whether the Fed's activities fall within
the scope of its statutory authority.' 66 There is simply no reasonable basis
to argue that an investigation into the legality of specific Fed programs
would compromise the central bank's independence. Rather than serve as
a threat, an audit would force the Fed to more stridently act to conform to
the law-appropriate behavior for an entity created by Congress with the
ability to bind the federal government and United States citizens to a wide
array of near unlimited financial obligations.
161. H.R. 1207.
162. Steve Cauley, Audit of FederalReserve Gains Momentum, EXAMINER.COM, Aug.
6, 2009, http://www.examiner.com/x-19241-Austin-Libertarian-Examiner-y2009m8d6Audit-of-Federal-Reserve-gains-momentum.
163. S.604.
164. See supra Part IV.B.
165. The Daily Bail, JPMand Maiden Lane: What the Fed Doesn't Want Us to Know,
http://seekingalpha.com/article/149488-jpm-and-maiden-lane-what-the-fed-doesn-t-wantus-to-know (last visited Jan. 26, 2010) (emphasis omitted).
166. Posting of Declan McCullagh to Econwatch, http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/
2009/07/28/business/econwatch/entry5l93539.shtml (July 28, 2009, 12:32 EST).
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A concern by the Fed that a review of the details of this now-hidden
activity would result in political gamesmanship, if proven valid, could be
accommodated by limiting the disclosure of this information, as is done
for disclosures of national security information to Congress for its
oversight of military and intelligence agencies. 167 At the very least, elected
members of Congress should be afforded the power to see the full details
of the Fed's transactions.
Ultimately, the Fed's illegal purchases of private assets from private
companies provide the most striking rationale to date for Congress to
authorize a comprehensive and independent audit into the central bank's
lending and purchasing activities.
CONCLUSION

The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 established a central banking system
that was part private and part public. Unfortunately, the Fed has used its
partially private nature to circumvent the scope of its statutory authority
under the 1913 Act. The lack of transparency in the Fed's behavior has
enabled the Fed to engage in purchases of private assets that are
impermissible under the law. As a result, Congress should authorize a
comprehensive and independent audit of the Fed's purchasing and lending
activities. Only through exposure can the negative effects of the Fed's
opaque actions be resolved and the current financial crisis addressed in a
productive way.

167. See, e.g., National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 413, 413a (2006).

